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Abstract. A new large class of 2100 possible stream ciphers as key stream generators
KSGs, is presented. The sample cipher-structure-concept is based on randomly
selecting a set of 16 maximum-period Nonlinear Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs).
A non-linear combining function is merging the 16 selected sequences. All resulting
stream ciphers with a total state-size of 223 bits are designed to result with the same
security level and have a linear complexity exceeding 281 and a period exceeding 2161.
A Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) is created randomly by selecting one cipher from
that class of 2100 ciphers. SUC concept was presented recently as a physical security
anchor to overcome the drawbacks of the traditional analog Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs). Such unknown ciphers may be permanently self-created within
System-on-Chip SoC non-volatile FPGA devices to serve as a digital clone-resistant
structure. Moreover, a lightweight identification protocol is presented in open networks
for physically identifying such SUC structures in FPGA-devices. The proposed new
family may serve for lightweight realization of clone-resistant identities in future self-
reconfiguring SoC non-volatile FPGAs. Such self-reconfiguring FPGAs are expected
to be emerging in the near future smart VLSI systems. The security analysis and
hardware complexities of the resulting clone-resistant structures are evaluated and
shown to exhibit scalable security levels even for post-quantum cryptography.
Keywords: Stream Cipher · keystream generator · NLFSR · linear complexity · Secret
Unknown Cipher · Physical Unclonable Functions · Self-reconfigurating SoC FPGAs
Introduction
Clone-Resistant Units have been well investigated during the last two decades. The aim
is to provide electronic systems with unique and secure identities making them resistant
to cloning attacks. Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [Pap01] [AM17] [MV10] were
introduced to fabricate electronic unclonable units for secure identification/authentication
[TB06] [SVW10], memoryless key storage [Lim04] [ŠTO05] and intellectual property
protection [Int]. Due to the analog nature of all proposed PUF technologies, all techniques
proposed so far had limited use in real world applications due to economic cost factors and
failing long term stability. To overcome the PUFs issues, digital clone-resistant functions
were introduced in [Adi08]. In [AMM17], digital clone-resistant functions were coined as
Secret Unknown Ciphers. By definition, a Secret Unknown Cipher is a randomly, internally
generated cipher inside the chip where the user has no access or influence on its creation
process, even the producer is not able to backtrace the personalization process and deduce
the made random cipher [MA19] [MA18a].
∗This paper is under submission, and uploaded here only for comments and suggestions, and not for
any commercial use.
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Creating SUC requires designing families of secure ciphers with random components [MA19].
In [AM] [MA19], an SUC based on random block cipher was proposed, it is deploying
random optimal S-Boxes as source of randomness of the SUC design. It was shown that
deploying a fixed SUC design with small random components increases tremendously the
cardinality of the resulting SUC class. Also, this ensures that each element of the SUC
class has the same security level [MA19]. In [MAMH17], Random Stream Cipher (RSC)
based on single cycle T-Functions (Triangular Functions) has been proposed to construct
a class of SUCs. The proposed RSC-SUC makes use of DSP blocks embedded in modern
SoC FPGAs to implement single cycle T-Functions as part of the keystream generators.
Both proposed designs in [AM] [MA19] and [MAMH17] share the property of requiring a
small area that should be located inside the FPGA. Distributing the SUC design in both
cases would results with more area overhead and latency. In this paper, the SUC design
template is based on combining a set of NLFSRs. Distributing NLFSRs overall the FPGA
area is practically attainable since each NLFSR can be implemented in a free area of the
FPGA. This would ensure additionally a zero-cost implementation of the SUC and lower
its vulnerability to some side channel attacks.
In 2005, the European project ECRYPT launches a competition to design new stream
ciphers that might be suitable for widespread adoption. This project is called eSTREAM
(ECRYPT Stream Cipher Project) [ECR] and it received 35 submissions. When it came to
its end in 2008 [CT08], four of the proposals in the final portfolio [BCC+08] were suited to
fast encryption in software: HC-128, Rabbit, Salsa20/12 and Sosemanuk, while other four
stream ciphers offered particularly efficient hardware implementation: Grain v1, MICKEY
2.0, Trivium and F-FCSR-H which has been excluded later because of the cryptanalytic
results presented in [M. 08]. The last eStream portfolio includes seven algorithms [Tec09].
A number of NLFSR-based stream ciphers have been proposed to the eStream project such
as Achterbahn [GGK05] and Grain [HJM07]. Achterbahn was one of the challenging new
designs based on combining several NLFSRs with a non-linear combining function, which
performs nonlinear operations on sequences with distinct minimal polynomials [Rue86].
In [TWF06], authors highlight some problems in the design principle of Achterbahn
summarized in the small length of the NLFSRs and the weakness of the combining function.
The complexity of the attack presented in [TWF06] depends exponentially to the number
of shift registers and their size, and to the number of shift registers outputs that would
cancel the nonlinear part of the combining function if they are equal to zero. After selecting
the positions in the output sequence that cancel the nonlinear terms in the combining
function, the attack builds parity checks. We outline that a high number of shift registers
in the linear part of the combining function makes the attack complexity very high.
Contribution.
The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: firstly, a new large-class of
low-complexity stream ciphers with the same designed-security level is created. Each
resulting cipher, even when randomly selected, exhibits the same security level. The
cardinality of the cipher-class exceeds 2100 without considering the NLFSRs initial states
as a key of 223 bits. Secondly, the resulting ciphers are adapted to convert future VLSI-
devices to clone-resistant physical entities in future VLSI technologies. Finally, a new
generic-lightweight identification/authentication protocol is shown for VLSI-devices when
using such SUC-based structure.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows, section 1 describes the state of the art
of clone-resistan units, also it discusses Kerckhoffs’ principles in relation to SUC. Section 2
presents a detailed description of the key stream generator. In section 3, security analysis
of the proposed family of new stream ciphers is investigated. Section 4 describes a concept
for deploying this family to create SUCs and provide unique and robust identity to SoC
units. Section 5 presents the hardware complexity results and Section 6 concludes.
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1 Clone-Resistant Units
1.1 Physical Unclonable Functions
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [AM17] [MV10] [Pap01] are increasingly proposed
as central building block in cryptographic protocols and security architectures. They
are proposed to be used for secure devices identification/authentication, memoryless key
storage and intellectual property protection. Most PUFs responses are noisy and only
contain a limited amount of entropy. Hence, they cannot be used as keys directly. To
remedy this problem, fuzzy extractors [BGS+08] [DORS04] [ŠTO05] were proposed to be
used beside each PUF. They are working on two steps: in the enrollment phase, a helper
data is extracted by deploying a helper data algorithm. During the reconstruction phase,
fuzzy extractor algorithm uses the helper data and the PUF response to reproduce the
key. These error correction mechanisms are expensive and require high number of logic
gates [BGS+08] [DORS04].
Furthermore, many attacks on PUFs have been proposed recently, they are targeting
both weak PUFs and strong PUFs [GKST07] [RDK12]; weak PUFs have few challenges,
commonly only one challenge per PUF instance, hence it is assumed that the access to
the weak PUF response is restricted. However, semi-invasive means have been used to
reveal the state of memory-based PUF [NSHB13]. The second major PUFs types are
Strong PUFs, they have large number of challenge-response pairs and they are unpre-
dictable. Hence, protecting the challenge-response interface is not required. Strong PUFs
are less susceptible to cloning and invasive attacks as weak PUFs. However, modeling
attack constitutes a strong technique to clone strong PUFs, it has been introduced firstly
by D. Lim to model an Arbiter-Based PUF [Lim04] and later on by Matzoobi et al.
to evaluate linear and feed-forward PUF structures [MKP08]. Recently, Rührmair et
al. demonstrate PUF modeling attacks on many PUFs by using machine learning tech-
niques [RSS+13] [RDK12] [RSS+10]. The attack succeeds if the adversary constructs an
algorithm which behaves indistinguishably from the original PUF on almost all Challenge
Response Pairs (CRPs). In [MSSS11], side channel attack was used to analyze PUFs
architecture and fuzzy extractor implementations by deploying power analysis. Recent
trends combine both side channel and modeling attacks [DV13] [MRMK13] to facilitate
machine learning which is deployed in modeling attack.
1.2 Secret Unknown Cipher
Digital physical clone-resistant units based on pseudo-random functions have been proposed
in [AS07] [Adi08] to overcome some of the PUFs drawbacks especially their inconsistency.
Those Physical Clone-Resistant Functions were nominated later on as Secret Unknown
Ciphers (SUCs) [AM] [MAMH17].
Definition 1. Secret Unknown Cipher is a randomly internally generated cipher/hash
inside the chip, where the user has no access or influence on its creation process, even
the producer should not be able to back trace the creation process and deduce the made
random cipher. Each generated SUC can be defined as an invertible Pseudo Random
Function (PRF), as follows:
SUC : {0, 1}n −→ {0, 1}m
X
PRF−−−→ Y
(1)
and
SUC−1 : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n
Y
PRF−1−−−−−→ X
(2)
4 New Family of Stream Ciphers as Physically Clone-Resistant VLSI-Structures
GENIE 
Trusted Authority 
Created Secret 
Cipher known 
only to the chip 
1 2 
Load a Smart  Cipher 
  “GENIE”  (Software package) 
3 
TRNG 
GENIE 
TRNG 
SoC FPGA 
SoC FPGA 
SoC FPGA TRNG 
SN1 
X1,0 Y1,0 
… … 
X1,i Y1,i 
… … 
X1,t-1 Y1,t-1 
Xi 
Yi 
4 
SoC FPGA SN1 
Database DB 
SNn 
Xn,0 Yn,0 
… … 
Xn,i Yn,i 
… … 
Xn,t-1 Yn,t-1 
Figure 1: Concept for creating SUC in SoC FPGAs environment
For an SUC based on block cipher design, i.e. n = m. The optimum case is to design an
involutive SUC, such as SUC = SUC−1 and hence we define it as follows:
SUC : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
where SUC(SUC(X)) = X for all X ∈ {0, 1}n (3)
Figure 1 describes the concept for embedding SUC in System on Chip (SoC) FPGA
devices. The personalization process proceeds as follows, the Trusted Authority (TA)
disposes of a software package called “GENIE” that contains an algorithm for creating
internally random secure ciphers in addition to a package of cryptographically strong
functions that will be used to design each SUC. The TA injects for a short time into each
SoC FPGA unit the GENIE which runs only one time (step 1). After being loaded into the
chip, the GENIE creates a permanent (non-volatile) and unpredictable random cipher by
deploying random bits from the True Random Number Generator (TRNG) (step 2). When
the GENIE completes the creation of the SUC, it will be fully deleted (step 3). After that,
the SoC FPGA will contain its unique and unpredictable SUC. The TA challenges the
SUC by a set of challenges Xi and gets the corresponding responses Yi = SUC(Xi) and
stores them on the corresponding area in its Units Individual Records (UIR) defined by the
Serial Number of the device SNi. The X/Y pairs are to be used later by a TA to identify
and authenticate devices. The concept is comparable to a PUF with the advantage that
with an SUC based on random block cipher design, recovering Y from X is possible by
using the inverse function of the SUC (SUC−1) or the same involution SUC. This property
was deployed in [MA18a] to build a chain of trust used for a secured vehicular over the
air software update, also for securing in-vehicle and vehicle-to-vehicle communication.
SUC invertability is also used in the generic identification and authentications protocols
in [AMM17] and other applications protocols such as in [MA18b]. In [AMM17], two generic
identification/authentication protocols have been proposed, they show a very efficient
identification protocol which eliminates storage of big number of challenge/response pairs,
also the device should embed a small memory of about t-bit to detect t-consumed X/Y
pairs, even without the need of deleting the used pairs during communication with the unit.
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In [AM] [MA19], template based SUC was presented, where a block cipher with random
components was designed as an SUC template. Optimal 4-bit S-Boxes were used as a
source of randomness, such as the GENIE selects few S-Boxes from some sets of all optimal
4-bit S-Boxes. Each resulting SUC from this class has the same security level. Furthermore,
in [MAMH17], Mars et al. proposed the first digital clone-resistant function prototype
based on Random Stream Cipher (RSC) deploying a class of T-Functions (Triangular
Functions) as key stream generator. We note that, identification and authentication
protocols designed for SUC based on random block ciphers would not be applicable directly
for an SUC based on random one-way function or on RSC.
As discussed before, many PUFs are susceptible to mathematical cloning hence they
are recently nominated as Physically Unclonable Functions. SUC designs ensure that it
is secure against known mathematical cryptanalysis as in [MA19] [MAMH17], and each
SUC have the same security level. Since each device embeds a unique SUC, the adversary
should break each unit alone with the same attack complexity. Moreover, SUC can be
implemented with zero cost; the hardware overhead of an SUC should be low such as
in [MA19]. Most industrial customer designs do not make full usage of the FPGA resources.
Hence with low overhead, SUC can make use of the free FPGA resources and can be
incrementally added to the customer design with zero cost.
1.3 Kerckhoffs’ principles and SUC
In [Ker83a], Kerckhoffs stated the principles that should apply to a cryptosystem. The
most concerning one, in relation to SUC, is the one stating that the method used to
encipher data is known to the opponent, and that security must lie in the choice of
key. However, ”This does not necessarily implies that the method should be public, but
only considered as public during its creation” [Ker83b] [Pet83]. Thus, SUC validates this
Kerckhoffs’s principle if and only if the SUC design is secure when considering that all
the components are publicly known. In this paper, a family of stream cipher is proposed
such that the NLFSRs feedback functions are selected randomly together with the initial
NLFSRs states to generate SUCs. The security analysis of the proposed family of stream
ciphers is investigated by considering that the cipher design is publicly known. i.e. the
NLFSRs’s feedback functions are known.
Cryptanalyzing SUCs in the field would require two steps:
• Reversing the secret components: an adversary is forced to reverse the random
selected functions that are used by the SUC.
• Breaking the resulting stream cipher : After reversing the secret parameters of an
SUC, this SUC could be considered as a publicly known cipher and an adversary
would apply known cryptanalytical attack to break this SUC.
Since each SUC is assumed to be generated randomly, attacking each SUC requires
to repeat the same attack with the same complexity. This constitutes an advantage over
using any secure stream cipher with publicly known specifications and with a randomly
generated secret key. For this latest solution, the attack complexity is only based on
breaking the publicly known stream cipher. Another advantage by design, is that for the
proposed SUC, the secrets are distributed and not located in the same area such that
when deploying a random secret key, this makes it hard to physically break the SUC.
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2 Description of the Keystream Generator
The basic components of the KSG are 16 Non-Linear Feedback Shift Registers (NLFSRs)
of lengths 6 to 17 and 19, 21, 22 and 23, combined by a balanced Boolean function F
with algebraic degree 4, correlation immunity 8 and algebraic immunity 4. The NLFSRs
are such that they can produce binary sequences of maximum period 2N − 1, where N is
the length of the shift register. Each shift register has a corresponding set of non-linear
feedback function updating the internal state of the shift register. The outputs of the 16
NLFSRs deliver the 16 inputs of the combining function F which outputs the running key
Zt. The 5 4-bits Look Up Tables (4-LUTs) implement the Boolean combining function F .
The total number of all the NLFSRs bits is 223 bits. This design is hardware oriented to
FPGA environment where the basic logic computing unit in FPGA is 4-LUT.
The key-loading algorithm that determines the initial internal states of the NLFSRs from
a key (K ≥ 80 bits) and an initial vector (IV) will not be investigated in this paper since it
is not required for SUC usage, i.e. the key (K) can be the initial NLFSRs states. Generally,
two requirements are important for the key loading algorithm: for all possible keys (K),
the key loading algorithm should generate non-zero initial states for the NLSRs, also it
should be resistant to side channel attacks.
Figure 2 describes the proposed stream cipher design.
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Figure 2: Description of the keystream generator
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2.1 Non-Linear Feedback Shift Registers
The principal components of KSG are the 16 NLFSRs with lengths from 6 to 17 and 19,
21, 23 and 24. Each N -bit NLFSR has a set of feedback functions ensuring all a maxi-
mum period of 2N−1. This section will describe in details the NLFSRs design methodology.
Definition 2. A feedback Shift Register consists of pure cycles if and only if its feedback
function has the form:
f(x0, x1, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ g(x1, ..., xN−1) (4)
where g is a Boolean function that does not depend on x0.
Definition 3. A (binary) de Bruijn sequence is a sequence of period 2N in which each
N -bit pattern occurs exactly once in one period of the sequence.
The linear complexities of order N de Bruijn sequences are bounded by 2N−1 +N and
2N − 1 [CGK82].
There are 22N−1−N different N -bit Fibonacci NLFSRs with the period 2N [Fre82].
Definition 4. A modified de Bruijn sequence is a sequence of period 2N − 1 in which
each N -bit pattern occurs exactly once in one period of the sequence.
In [Dub], a list of maximum period (2N − 1) NLFSRs of N -bits with 4 ≤ N ≤ 24 has
been presented. The search covers three types of feedback functions with algebraic degree
two:
• f1(x0, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ g1(xa, xb, xc, xd) = x0 ⊕ xa ⊕ xb ⊕ xcxd
• f2(x0, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ g2(xa, xb, xc, xd, xe) = x0 ⊕ xa ⊕ xbxc ⊕ xdxe
• f3(x0, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ g3(xa, xb, xc, xd, xe, xh) = x0 ⊕ xa ⊕ xb ⊕ xc ⊕ xd ⊕ xexh
Where a, b, c, d, e, h ∈ 1, 2, ..., N − 1.
The presented NLFSRs in [Dub] do not include the all-0 state in their longest cycle of
states of period 2N − 1.
The set of N -bit Fibonacci NLFSRs with the period 2N − 1 can be partitioned into
4 subsets [Jan89]: basic, reverse of basic, complement of basic, and reverse complement
of basic. In [Dub], only NLFSRs with basic form were listed. The forms of the reverse,
complement and reverse complement of the basic form (equation 4) are described as follows:
• Reverse form: fr(x0, x1, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ g(xN−1, ..., x1)
• Complement form: fc(x0, x1, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ 1⊕ g(x1, ..., xN−1)
• Reverse complement form: frc(x0, x1, ..., xN−1) = x0 ⊕ 1⊕ g(xN−1, ..., x1)
Thus, for each listed feedback function in [Dub], three feedback functions generating the
reverse, complement or reverse complement sequence can be deduced.
In [Dub], for each NLFSR Ai with Ni-bit where 4 ≤ Ni ≤ 24, a set of feedback functions
ensuring maximum period of 2Ni − 1 was presented. All feedback functions have the form
in equation 4. For NLFSRs with Ni-bit, SNi denotes the set of boolean functions g listed
in [Dub] (by removing the xor with x0) together with their reverse, complement and reverse
complement form. We coin those functions as Random Feedback Functions (RFFNi). The
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Figure 3: General structure of the NLFSRs
set SNi with only the functions having basic form (without xor with x0) are listed in
Table 1.
Figure 3 describes the general structure of the used NLFSRs. For each NLFSR Ai
of length Ni, the feedback function contains Random Feedback Function (RFFNi). Its
general form is defined as follows:
f(x0, x1, ..., xNi−1) = x0 ⊕RFFNi(x1, ..., xNi−1) (5)
Where:
• For each NLFSR Ai of length Ni, a set of random feedback functions SNi is selected
such that each of its RFF jNi makes the NLFSR Ai achieves a maximum period of
2Ni − 1. where:
RFFNi ∈ SNi = {RFF 1Ni , ..., RFF jNi , ..., RFF
|Ai|
Ni
} (6)
During the personalization process, one of the feedback functions is to be selected
randomly from this set and will be used to construct NLFSR Ai.
Each selected NLFSR Ai in Figure 2 has a form of the general structure in Figure 3,
and generates a nonlinear sequence of period 2Ni − 1 which is a nonlinear modified de
Bruijn sequence. The linear complexity Li of an NLFSR Ai is bounded by:
2Ni−1 +Ni ≤ Li ≤ 2Ni − 1 (7)
The number of NLFSRs and their lengths are selected to satisfy the primarily security
requirements described in the following:
• B-M Algorithm attack: in order to ensure that the attack complexity of B-M
Algorithm is over 280; in terms of time complexity, the linear complexity L of the
total key stream sequence should exceed 240, since the complexity of B-M algorithm
attack is the square of the linear complexity. For the data complexity, it is 2L and
hence L should be greater than or equal to 280.
• Correlation immunity: If an adversary succeeds to recover the randomly selected
feedback functions, she/he can try to mount a correlation attack. In this case, to
protect the system against correlation attack, the total number of bits of certain
number of the least NLFSRs, where the number is determined by the correlation
immunity, should exceed the computing power namely 280. The correlation immunity
of the combining function F is equal to 8, thus the total number of bits of the shortest
9 NLFSRs should exceed 80.
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With these two constraints, we obtain the optimal NLFSRs designs for the proposal.
Table 1 describes the sets SNi of the selected random feedback function RFFNi that
have only the basic form, the reverse, complement and reverse complement forms can be
deduced easily. In the format of the RFFNi , indexes of variables of each product-term of
a feedback function are separated by a comma, round bracket around the indexes denotes
that those indexes belong to the same product-term. For example, 1,2,(2,4) represent the
RFFNi :
RFFNi(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x1 + x2 + x2x4 (8)
Table 1: Sets of selected random feedback functions for each NLFSR length
NLFSR Length Ni Set of Random Feedback Functions SNi
A1 6
1,2,(1,2); 1,2,(2,4); 1,3,(1,5); 1,4,(1,4); 2,3,(1,3);2,3,(1,5); 2,3,(2,3);
2,3,(2,4); 1,(1,2),(4,5); 1,(1,3),(3,5); 1,(2,3),(2,5); 2,(1,3),(2,4);
2,(1,3),(3,4); 2,(1,3),(3,5); 2,(1,5),(2,4); 2,(1,5),(4,5); 2,(2,3),(3,5);
2,(3,4),(3,5); 3,(1,4),(2,3); 3,(1,4),(2,4); 3,(1,4),(3,4);
A2 7
1,2,(2,6); 1,4,(1,3); 1,5,(1,5); 1,5,(3,5); 1,5,(4,6); 2,4,(1,2); 2,4,(2,5);
1,(1,2),(5,6); 1,(1,5),(3,4); 1,(1,6),(4,5); 1,(2,3),(3,5); 1,(2,5),(3,5);
1,(2,5),(4,5); 1,(3,4),(4,5); 2,(1,2),(4,6); 2,(1,4),(3,4); 2,(1,5),(2,6);
2,(1,6),(2,4); 2,(1,6),(3,6); 2,(1,6),(5,6); 2,(2,4),(3,5); 2,(2,5),(4,6);
2,(2,6),(4,6); 2,(3,6),(5,6); 3,(1,2),(2,3); 3,(1,3),(1,6); 3,(1,4),(3,6);
3,(1,5),(3,5); 3,(1,6),(3,4); 3,(2,3),(4,5); 3,(2,5),(3,5); 1,2,3,4,(1,6);
1,2,3,4,(2,3); 1,2,3,4,(2,6); 1,2,3,6,(1,3); 1,2,3,6,(1,5); 1,2,3,6,(2,6);
1,2,4,5,(1,2); 1,2,4,5,(1,5); 1,2,4,5,(2,6)
A3 8
1,5,(1,5); 1,6,(1,2); 1,6,(1,7); 1,6,(2,4); 1,6,(4,5); 1,6,(5,6); 2,5,(2,4);
2,5,(3,7); 2,5,(4,5); 3,4,(2,4); 3,4,(2,7); 3,4,(3,4); 3,4,(4,6); 3,4,(4,7);
3,4,(6,7); 1,(1,4),(2,4); 1,(1,6),(2,5);1,(2,3),(2,4); 1,(2,4),(6,7);
1,(3,4),(4,7); 2,(1,3),(4,6); 2,(1,3),(5,7); 2,(1,5),(6,7); 2,(1,7),(2,3);
2,(3,7),(6,7); 3,(1,2),(2,4); 3,(1,4),(2,4); 3,(1,6),(3,6); 3,(1,6),(4,6);
3,(1,6),(4,7); 3,(2,3),(5,6); 3,(2,4),(6,7); 3,(2,6),(3,7); 1,2,3,5,(2,6);
1,2,3,6,(3,5); 1,2,3,6,(5,7); 1,2,4,5,(2,4); 1,2,4,7,(1,5); 1,2,5,7,(2,4);
1,3,4,7,(1,4); 1,3,4,7,(1,6); 1,3,4,7,(3,7)
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1,6,(4,6); 1,6,(4,8); 2,4,(4,5); 3,4,(3,7); 1,(1,5),(2,5); 1,(1,6),(6,7);
1,(1,8),(2,7); 1,(1,8),(5,6); 1,(2,3),(3,8); 1,(2,8),(3,7); 1,(3,4),(3,5);
1,(3,7),(5,8); 2,(1,5),(4,6); 2,(1,6),(2,7); 2,(1,8),(3,4); 2,(2,7),(4,6);
2,(4,7),(5,6); 3,(1,2),(4,7); 3,(1,6),(1,7); 3,(1,7),(4,8); 3,(2,3),(4,7);
4,(1,3),(2,8); 4,(1,6),(3,6); 4,(2,3),(5,8); 4,(2,5),(2,8); 4,(2,7),(3,8);
4,(2,8),(6,7); 4,(3,5),(3,7); 1,2,3,4,(3,7); 1,2,3,7,(4,6); 1,2,4,7,(1,6);
1,2,5,6,(1,6); 1,2,5,6,(2,6); 1,2,5,8,(2,6); 1,2,6,7,(3,6); 1,3,4,5,(3,7);
1,3,5,7,(5,6); 1,3,5,8,(3,5); 1,4,6,7,(1,7); 2,3,4,7,(2,8)
A5 10
1,2,(8,9); 1,4,(3,7); 1,8,(6,7); 2,5,(1,5); 4,5,(2,6); 4,5,(4,8); 4,5,(4,9);
1,(1,2),(3,4); 1,(2,4),(2,5); 1,(2,8),(7,9); 1,(3,8),(4,7); 1,(4,8),(6,7);
2,(1,3),(4,7); 2,(1,4),(3,7); 2,(1,5),(3,5); 2,(1,5),(4,9); 2,(1,6),(1,7);
2,(1,7),(4,6); 2,(1,9),(5,9); 2,(3,5),(3,7); 2,(3,9),(8,9); 3,(1,2),(2,8);
3,(1,3),(7,9); 3,(1,6),(3,8); 3,(1,6),(6,9); 3,(2,3),(2,6); 3,(2,7),(8,9);
3,(2,8),(7,9); 3,(6,7),(8,9); 4,(1,3),(1,7); 4,(1,3),(7,8); 4,(1,3),(7,9);
4,(1,5),(1,9); 4,(1,5),(7,9); 4,(7,8),(7,9); 1,2,4,8,(1,5); 1,2,4,8,(2,4);
1,2,5,8,(5,9); 1,3,4,7,(3,6); 1,3,6,7,(1,6); 1,4,5,9,(1,9); 1,4,5,9,(4,9);
1,4,5,9,(5,9); 1,5,6,7,(2,8); 2,3,4,6,(3,6); 2,4,5,8,(2,4); 2,4,6,7,(1,6)
Continued on next page
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Table 1 – Continued from previous page
NLFSR Length Ni Set of "basic" Random Feedback Functions SNi
A6 11
1,9,(1,4); 2,5,(1,9); 2,8,(6,9); 1,(1,7),(2,8); 1,(1,9),(2,7); 1,(2,3),(4,5);
1,(2,5),(3,4); 1,(2,7),(3,10); 1,(3,7),(3,8); 1,(3,7),(7,8); 2,(4,5),(6,10);
2,(4,6),(9,10); 2,(7,9),(8,10); 3,(1,6),(8,9); 3,(1,9),(5,10); 3,(2,7),(5,7);
3,(3,5),(6,9); 3,(3,6),(5,8); 3,(3,7),(7,10); 4,(1,2),(9,10); 4,(2,3),(2,10);
4,(3,7),(4,8); 5,(1,4),(6,9); 5,(2,8),(6,8); 5,(4,7),(6,7); 1,2,3,5,(4,6);
1,2,4,5,(4,6); 1,2,4,7,(2,3); 1,2,4,7,(4,9); 1,2,4,7,(8,9); 1,2,4,10,(1,9);
1,2,4,10,(3,9); 1,2,7,8,(1,9); 1,2,7,8,(9,10); 1,3,4,10,(6,10); 1,3,6,8,(6,8);
1,3,6,10,(7,9); 1,3,7,9,(1,8); 1,4,5,8,(5,7); 1,4,7,10,(1,9); 1,5,6,8,(5,9);
1,5,7,9,(2,8); 1,6,8,9,(2,6); 2,3,7,8,(4,10); 2,3,7,8,(6,10); 2,3,7,8,(7,10);
2,4,5,9,(5,9); 3,4,5,6,(2,10); 3,4,6,7,(2,3); 3,5,6,7,(4,8)
A7 12
3,8,(3,9); 4,7,(1,7); 4,7,(4,7); 1,(2,3),(3,4); 1,(2,5),(3,10); 1,(2,8),(6,10);
1,(7,8),(8,10); 1,(8,11),(9,10); 2,(1,3),(3,6); 2,(1,7),(2,8); 2,(1,10),(1,11);
2,(2,3),(7,9); 2,(3,9),(3,11); 2,(3,9),(5,9); 2,(5,11),(8,11); 2,(7,9),(7,11);
3,(1,8),(7,10); 3,(5,11),(6,10); 1,2,3,5,(5,9); 1,2,5,9,(7,11); 1,2,6,11,(2,6);
1,3,6,7,(4,10); 1,3,6,9,(1,9); 1,3,6,9,(4,10); 1,3,7,10,(4,5); 1,4,8,10,(2,5);
1,5,6,8,(4,6); 1,5,6,8,(6,10); 1,5,6,11,(7,8); 1,5,7,9,(1,11); 1,5,9,10,(6,7);
2,3,4,10,(3,8); 2,3,6,8,(3,6); 2,3,6,10,(2,6); 2,3,6,10,(4,10); 2,5,6,10,(2,10)
A8 13
1,11,(5,9); 4,8,(9,10); 1,(1,7),(3,7); 1,(2,3),(6,11); 1,(2,5),(5,11);
1,(2,6),(6,8); 1,(2,9),(4,5); 2,(1,6),(9,12); 2,(7,10),(10,12); 3,(1,9),(2,11);
3,(4,6),(9,11); 3,(8,9),(9,10); 4,(1,3),(4,6); 4,(1,3),(10,12); 4,(2,9),(8,10);
5,(1,5),(4,9); 5,(1,12),(7,11); 5,(2,9),(4,5); 5,(3,6),(4,9); 5,(3,12),(9,11);
6,(1,5),(2,12); 1,2,4,5,(1,7); 1,2,10,11,(6,12); 1,3,4,6,(6,10); 1,4,5,10,(4,8);
1,5,6,7,(5,9); 1,5,7,9,(8,9); 1,5,7,11,(8,10); 1,7,10,11,(2,6); 1,8,9,10,(8,9);
2,3,8,11,(1,10); 2,5,6,11,(8,11); 2,6,7,10,(8,12); 3,4,5,12,(4,5);
3,5,6,10,(8,11); 3,5,7,10,(2,10)
A9 14
1,2,(7,12); 1,(2,13),(4,12); 1,(5,12),(9,12); 2,(1,5),(3,11);
3,(1,6),(4,12); 3,(2,4),(6,12); 3,(2,12),(6,13); 3,(5,10),(7,12);
5,(2,4),(6,13); 6,(1,13),(5,9); 6,(5,9),(12,13); 1,2,3,5,(1,3);
1,2,4,7,(1,3); 1,4,5,8,(2,8); 1,4,5,13,(1,6); 1,4,7,11,(1,11);
1,6,10,12,(3,7); 1,6,10,12,(7,9); 1,7,9,12,(3,13); 2,3,5,7,(1,5);
2,3,10,12,(9,10); 2,5,6,12,(6,10); 2,7,9,11,(11,12);
4,5,6,8,(1,4); 4,6,7,10,(5,13)
A10 15
5,9,(2,11); 2,(6,8),(12,14); 4,(2,11),(7,10); 4,(5,6),(5,14);
4,(6,10),(9,10); 4,(7,8),(12,14); 6,(8,11),(12,13); 7,(2,11),(10,13);
7,(3,12),(3,13); 1,3,7,11,(9,10); 1,4,5,12,(3,4); 1,4,6,11,(2,14);
1,4,9,10,(7,10); 1,5,11,13,(5,11); 2,3,9,10,(6,10); 2,3,9,13,(3,7);
2,4,10,14,(4,10); 3,4,5,10,(3,7); 3,5,7,8,(3,13); 4,5,7,10,(1,14);
4,8,12,14,(5,6); 4,9,11,14,(1,13); 5,6,11,14,(5,8); 5,6,12,13,(5,9)
A11 16
2,13,(2,3); 3,(1,5),(5,7; 3,(2,13),(7,14); 5,(4,8),(6,12); 5,(4,12),(7,8);
7,(2,6),(10,13); 7,(8,14),(11,12); 1,2,3,9,(6,14); 1,5,13,14,(14,15);
1,11,12,13,(5,15); 2,5,10,14,(6,14); 2,6,11,12,(14,15); 2,7,8,10,(3,6);
2,7,8,13,(3,15); 4,8,9,10,(8,12)
A12 17
1,(7,10),(9,15); 3,(6,9),(13,14); 5,(4,7),(6,13); 6,(2,9),(7,12); 7,(1,8),(9,14);
8,(10,12),(11,16); 1,3,9,12,(7,13); 1,3,12,14,(2,10); 1,5,9,11,(1,13);
1,7,11,13,(6,14); 2,4,9,12,(6,16); 3,6,7,10,(9,15); 3,8,11,12,(3,11);
4,6,10,16,(3,11); 5,6,9,14,(6,14)
A13 19 7,10,(6,18); 9,12,(1,13); 2,(6,8),(8,10); 4,(5,16),(7,14); 6,(4,8),(17,18);1,4,5,8,(5,15); 1,4,8,17,(1,13); 3,7,9,16,(3,17); 5,6,12,14,(2,18)
A14 21 1,15,17,19,(13,15); 2,7,12,17,(4,10); 3,5,9,13,(15,17); 4,8,9,11,(3,11)
A15 22 1,(4,10),(11,18); 5,(4,12),(7,14); 1,6,8,12,(10,17);1,10,16,18,(3,21); 5,6,11,15,(9,21)
A16 23 3,(13,19),(18,19); 2,6,10,14,(5,13); 3,11,16,18,(4,19)
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2.2 Cardinality of the KSG
The proposed KSGs can be used to create a family of SUC. In general, this design
randomness is based on deploying all possible feedback functions ensuring that the N -bit
NLFSR generates a sequence with period 2N − 1. There are 22N−1−N+1 different N -bit
Fibonacci NLFSRs with the period 2N − 1 [Fre82]. Hence, the following theorem can be
deduced.
Theorem 1. Let Ni be the lengths of the NLFSRs of the KSG, where Ni ∈ S such as
S = {6, ..., 17, 19, 21, 22, 23} in this case.
The cardinality of the KSG deploying all Fibonacci Ni-NLFSRs with period 2Ni is:
ς = 2
∑
Ni∈S
2Ni−1−Ni+1 (9)
In this paper, the NLFSRs selected for the proposed design can be made random, since
for each N -bit NLFSR there exist a number of possible feedback functions ensuring a
maximum period of 2N . Hence randomly selecting one of the feedback functions for each
NLFSR Ai will ensure the same security level of the resulting random KSG as will be
investigated through this paper.
Table 2 presents the number of NLFSRs |Ai| for each used NLFSR Ai with length Ni:
Table 2: Number of all selected NLFSRs
i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
|Ai| 84 160 168 160 188 200 144 144
i 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
|Ai| 100 96 60 60 36 16 20 12
Theorem 2. Let Ni be the lengths of the NLFSRs of the KSG, where Ni ∈ S such as
S = {6, ..., 17, 19, 21, 22, 23}.
We denote by |Ai| the number of NLFSRs Ai. The cardinality of the KSG is:
ς = 2
∑
i∈S log2(|Ai|) (10)
This results with cardinality: ς ≈ 2100
Furthermore, the 223 initial state is defined randomly by means of the TRNG adding
an entropy of about 223 bits.
2.3 Boolean combining Function
The Algebraic Normal Form (ANF) of the proposed Boolean combining function is as
follows:
F (x1, ..., x16) = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8
+x9x11 + x10x11 + x10x12 + x13x15 + x14x15 + x14x16
+x9x10x11 + x10x11x12 + x13x14x15x16
(11)
This Boolean combining function consists of two parts:
• The linear part, which contains the monomials of degree one x1 to x8, can be realized
with two 4-LUTs,
• The non-linear part containing monomials of degree two and three, related to the
terms x9 to x16 can also be realized with another two 4-LUTs. The outputs of all
four 4-LUTs are combined with one 4-LUT to generate the keystream Zt.
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Properties of the BF.
Definition 5. The Boolean combining function F can be described as follows:
F : {0, 1}16 → {0, 1} (12)
The structure of a Boolean combining function is widely deployed in stream cipher
designs. Although LFSR (linear feedback shift register)/ NLFSR (non-linear feedback
shift register) can be excellent pseudo-random generators for being efficient, fast and with
good statistical properties. They may be prone to be attacked due to linearity.
A secure combining Boolean function should have the following properties: balanced, high
algebraic degree, high correlation immunity and high nonlinearity. In the following, we
present the analysis results of the Boolean combining function F .
2.3.1 Balanced
A Boolean combining function is balanced if and only if the numbers of ‘1’s and ‘0’s in
its truth table are equal. Since the LFSRs/NLFSRs are supposed to be randomly i.d.d.
(independent identically distributed), the combining function must be balanced to satisfy
the pseudo-randomness. Otherwise, by inputting a large number of randomly selected
values, the output value will not be balanced. Furthermore, the whole system would be
vulnerable to cryptanalytic attacks.
The Boolean combining function F is balanced.
2.3.2 Algebraic degree
The algebraic degree is the degree of ANF of the Boolean combining function. Since the
ANF of the Boolean combining function has degree 4, the algebraic degree of F is 4.
2.3.3 Correlation immunity
Before we introduce the correlation immunity, an introduction to Walsh Transformation is
needed.
Definition 6. Let x = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and ω = (ω1, ω2, ..., ωn) be n-tuples over {0, 1} ,
and dot product of x and ω is defined as:
x.ω = x1ω1 + x2ω2 + ...+ xnωn (13)
Then the Walsh Transformation on a n-variable Boolean function f(x) is defined as :
F (ω) =
∑
x
f(x)(−1)xω (14)
The Correlation immunity can be calculated based on the Walsh Transformation as
follows: If for all 1 ≤ wt(ω) ≤ t, with wt(ω) is the weight of ω, the Walsh Transformation
F (ω) = 0 , then the number t is called correlation immunity.
The correlation immunity of the Boolean combining function F is 8.
2.3.4 Nonlinearity
The nonlinearity is the distance from the combining function F to the set of affine functions
of n-variables (An):
NL(F ) = minh∈And(F, h) (15)
The non-linearity of the combining function F is: NL(F ) = 26624
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2.3.5 Algebraic immunity
For F : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}, define AN(F ) = {g : {0, 1}m → {0, 1}/F.g = 0}, any function
g ∈ AN(F ) is called the annihilator of F . The algebraic immunity of F is the minimum
degree of all the nonzero annihilators of F and of all those of F + 1. In [CM03], it was
proved that the algebraic immunity is less than or equal to n/2 for any n-variable Boolean
function F . The algebraic immunity of the Boolean combining function F is 4.
As a summary, the Boolean combining function F is balanced with algebraic degree 4,
correlation immunity 8, nonlinearity 26624 and algebraic immunity 4.
3 Security Analysis
In this section, we present a security analysis of the stream cipher against the following
attacks: Brute force attack, Correlation Attack, Algebraic Attack and Parity Check Attack.
3.1 Brute force attack
3.1.1 Exhaustive search of NLFSRs initial states
The first brute force attack is exhaustive search of all the internal states in NLFSRs. The
Adversary will enumerate all possible states, then generate the corresponding sequence
in each case and compare it with the known keystream. If the generated sequence and
the keystream match, then the internal states of the NLFSR are found and the cipher is
broken.
The complexity of this attack is:
Complexity = 2
∑i=16
i=1
Ni+
∑
i∈S log2(|Ai|) (16)
The total length of the NLFSRs is 223 bits and the cardinality of the KSG is ≈ 2100
resulting with a complexity of ≈ 2323. We conclude that the complexity of brute force
attack to guess all possible internal states is beyond possible computational power. So the
cipher is secure against this attack.
3.1.2 Berlekamp-Massey algorithm
The other smarter and important brute force attack algorithm is the Berlekamp-Massey
algorithm [Mas69]. In order to analyse the complexity of the B-M algorithm on the
proposed cipher, it is necessary to compute lower bound of the total linear complexity of
the output bit-stream. The time complexity of the B-M algorithm attack is the square of
the total linear complexity, and the data complexity is the double. If the lengths N1, ..., Nt
of the t shift registers are pairwise relatively prime, then the linear complexity L(ζ) of the
keystream ζ can be expressed as [Rue86]:
L(ζ) ≥ F (L1, ..., Lt) (17)
If the lengths of the primitive NLFSRs are not pairwise relatively prime, then equation
(5) does not hold. In this case, F (L1, ..., Lt) provides only an upper bound for L(ζ).
However, in many cases, it is still possible to derive a reasonable lower bound for the linear
complexity of ζ.
Lemma 1. [GGK06b] Let σ1, ..., σt be nonzero output sequences of primitive binary NLF-
SRs of lengths N1, ..., Nt, respectively, and with linear complexities L1, ..., Lt , respectively.
Let F (x1, ..., xt) be a Boolean function of algebraic degree d ≥ 1 . A lower bound for
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the linear complexity of the sequence ζ = F (σ1, ..., σt) can be given if the following two
conditions are fulfilled:
1. The algebraic normal form (ANF) of F (x1, ..., xt) contains a monomial xi1 , ..., xid
of degree d for which the corresponding shift register lengths N1, ..., Nd are pairwise
relatively prime.
2. For all other monomials of degree d, which have the form xi1 , ..., xij−1xikxij+1, ..., xid ,
we have gcd(Nij , Nk) = 1.
If both conditions are true, then:
L(ζ) ≥ Li1Li2 ...Lid (18)
The Boolean combining function F has algebraic degree 4, the ANF of it contains the
following monomial with degree 4:
x13x14x15x16
• The monomial x13x14x15x16 satisfies the condition 1 in Lemma 1: The lengths of
the corresponding shift registers are N13 = 19, N14 = 21, N15 = 22, N16 = 23 are
pairwise relatively prime.
• The other monomials in the ANF of the Boolean combining function are of degree
less than the degree of the monomial described in (6). Then condition 2 holds.
We conclude that the linear complexity of the keystream ζ is:
L(ζ) ≥ Li13Li14Li15Li16 > (218 + 19).(220 + 21).(221 + 22).(222 + 23) ≈ 281 (19)
B-M algorithm requires 2162 time complexity and 282 data complexity to break the proposed
KSG.
3.2 Correlation attack
The correlation attack was firstly proposed by T. Siegenthaler in 1984 [Sie84], then improved
by W. Meier and O. Staffelbach in 1989 as fast correlation attack [MS89]. The main idea of
correlation attack is to focus on the Boolean combining function of the KSG and find the
correlation between the combination of several LFSRs/NLFSRs and the output keystream.
This requires to have previous knowledge about the used NLFSRs, i.e. an adversary should
reverse the randomly selected feedback functions before applying this attack. Since, there
is more than 2100 possible combinations of feedback functions and about 2223 initial states,
trying to reverse the feedback functions is not possible.
Now, let us consider that an adversary knows the used feedback functions. In this case,
the adversary can apply correlation attack with an aim to recover the NLFSRs initial
states. By considering the classical fast-correlation attack, when the Boolean combining
function has correlation immunity n, the adversary needs at least n + 1 shift registers
at the same time. The correlation immunity of the Boolean combining function F is 8;
therefore the total length of the smallest 9 NLFSRs is:
i=14∑
i=6
i = 90 (20)
Thus, if an adversary is given the used feedback functions of an SUC, the complexity of the
correlation attack is at least 290. However, this attack can not be realized since for each
SUC the random feedback functions are selected randomly and internally inside the chip.
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3.3 Algebraic attack
The algebraic attack is another important attack against stream ciphers. It was introduced
in [Cou03] and extended in [CM03]. The main idea of the Algebraic attack is to find a
well-chosen multivariate polynomial G(s), such that G.F is of substantially lower degree,
where F (s) is the combining Boolean function and s is the current state. To examine
the degree of the linear polynomial equations system, an assertion for the degree of the
algebraic equations from [GGK06a] will be used. It is described in the following fact:
Fact [GGK06a] For 2Nj ≤ 2Nj − Nj , the kth entry in the monomial spectrum of the
shift registers Aj , with 1 ≤ j ≤ 16, contains close to 2Nj−1 different monomials and has in
general degree Nj−1.
For the Boolean combining function F , we find the term with highest degree and then
calculate it as follows: The highest term is x13x14x15x16 and its degree can be calculated
as:
(N13−1)(N14−1)+(N15−1)+(N16−1) = (19−1)+(21−1)+(22−1)(23−1) = 81 (21)
Since we need 2Nj − 2 different monomials, in order to express the bits of the sequence
by the initial state of each register. So we need:
(2N13 − 2)(2N14 − 2)(2N15 − 2)(2N16 − 2) ≈ 281 (22)
Different monomials in order to express the bits of the sequence from the highest degree
term. Set apart the remaining different monomials, the complexity for solving the system
of equations is:
O((281)ω) = O(2192.78) (23)
Where ω ≈ 2.38 is the exponent of the fast matrix multiplication. The complexity
of solving the system of equations ensures that the proposed algorithm is secure against
algebraic attack.
3.4 Parity Check attack
The parity check attack was firstly proposed in [TWF06], it can successfully break the
Achterbahn stream cipher. It starts with the weakness of the Boolean combining function
that if two terms are equal to 0, then the whole nonlinear part would be 0, therefore
the Boolean combining function is purely linear. After the linearization of the Boolean
combining function, a parity check is applied in order to retrieve possible inner states of
some certain registers.
Parity check attack is very sensitive to the number of terms in the combining function
after linearization, because that bits/terms are required to complete the parity check and
the number also determines the expected number of the inner states in certain registers,
which satisfy the precondition of the linearisation (some bits are equal to 0).
In the following, we present the security analysis of the proposed algorithm against parity
check attack. The ANF of the Boolean combining function F is defined as:
F (x1, ..., x16) = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8
+x9x11 + x10x11 + x10x12 + x13x15 + x14x15 + x14x16
+x9x10x11 + x10x11x12 + x13x14x15x16
(24)
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It has a linear part and a nonlinear part. When we examine the common terms of the
nonlinear part, if x9 = x10 = x13 = x14 = 0, then the Boolean combining function would
degenerate into a pure linear Boolean combining function:
l(x1, ..., x16) = x1 + x2 + x3 + x4 + x5 + x6 + x7 + x8 (25)
The upper bound of the linear complexity is relatively not that high:
L ≥
i=8∑
i=1
Li ≈ 214.9 (26)
So we can build an LFSR with length L, and we can also apply parity check on the
sequence output of the sequence from the linear Boolean combining function.
Parity Check. The periods of all the NLFSRs are as follows:
T1 = 26 − 1;T2 = 27 − 1;T3 = 28 − 1;T4 = 29 − 1;T5 = 210 − 1;
T6 = 211 − 1;T7 = 212 − 1;T8 = 213 − 1;
(27)
Where Ti denotes the period of the NLFSR Ai.
So, the parity check can be computed as follows:
ll(t) = l(t)⊕ l(t+ T1) (28)
Since the period of the first register is T1, this expression does not contain any term of x1.
Similarly:
lll(t) = ll(t)⊕ ll(t+ T2)
llll(t) = lll(t)⊕ lll(t+ T3)
lllll(t) = llll(t)⊕ llll(t+ T4)
llllll(t) = lllll(t)⊕ lllll(t+ T5)
lllllll(t) = llllll(t)⊕ llllll(t+ T6)
llllllll(t) = lllllll(t)⊕ lllllll(t+ T7)
(29)
Therefore llllllll(t) contains only terms of x8. Thus it satisfies:
llllllll(t) = lllllll(t)⊕ lllllll(t+ T8)
In terms of bits l(i) , we have the following equation:
l(t) + l(t+ T1) + l(t+ T2) + l(t+ T3) + l(t+ T4) + l(t+ T5) + l(t+ T6) + l(t+ T7)+
l(t+ T8) + l(t+ T1 + T2) + ...+ l(t+ T1 + T8) + l(t+ T2 + T3) + ...+ l(t+ T2 + T8) + ...
+ l(t+ T1 + T2 + T3) + ...+ l(t+ T1 + T2 + T8) + ...
+ ...
+ l(t+ T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7 + T8) = 0
This is the basic parity check on l(t) that can be used to attack the KSG, it is the
XOR between 256 bits from the sequence , within the time interval:
Tmax = T1 + T2 + T3 + T4 + T5 + T6 + T7 + T8 ≈ 215
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It is the complexity required for the parity check attack, but the degeneration happens
under the condition x9 = x10 = x13 = x14 = 0 and the complexity to satisfy this condition
should be considered.
Consider the x9 register first, which x9 = 0 is the condition for further parity check
attack. For every bit used in parity check, totally 256 bits, they should all satisfy the
condition. The number of all the possible internal states in register x9 is 214. Since the
output should be independent and identically distributed (i.d.d), the expected number of
cases that satisfy this condition is:
214 × 2−256 = 2−242 (30)
At this step, the attack cannot continue, since the possibility of finding a case satisfying
the condition x9 = 0 is too small to ignore.
4 Application of Secret Unknown Ciphers
Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) is a digital clone-resistant unit that can be deployed as
a security anchor in wide spectrum of applications such as automotive security [MA18a].
SUC is a random cipher created internally in SoC FPGAs resulting with unique and
unpredictable random cipher even for the producer for each SoC unit. To create SUC,
ciphers/hashes with flexible components that can be generated randomly should be designed.
In this paper, SUC based on combining random NLFSRs with identical cryptographic
properties is presented. Recently, all published generic protocols deploying SUC [AMM17]
are designed to be used for SUC based on random block ciphers. Protocols targeted for
random stream ciphers or random key stream generators based SUC will be investigated
in the following.
4.1 Enrollment protocol
During the enrollment process, the Trusted Authority (TA) stimulates a unit A by a
command (cmd) to generate a k-bit response Y . The k-bit response results from running
the KSG k-cycle. This operation is to be done sequentially to generate all the responses
Y0, . . . , Yt−1.
Figure 4 describes the enrollment protocol.
4.2 Identification protocol
Figure 5 describes the identification protocol, it proceeds as follows:
• Unit A sends its serial number SNA to the TA that checks for its existence in the
TA units identification records UIR. if SNA ∈ UIR, then TA accepts and continues
otherwise it rejects and abort.
• The TA selects the exact Yi and generates a random number RT . The, it encrypts
RT with a standard cipher by using Yi as key and sends it in concatenation with RT
as ET (RT )||RT .
• Unit A generates the next response Y ′i and decrypts the received message as
E−1(EYi(RT )) = R′T . If RT 6= R′T then the received message doesn’t come from the
TA and the unit rejects and abort the communication. Meanwhile, unit A keeps the
state Si−1. This protects the system from being desynchronized. When RT = R′T ,
unit A generates a random number RA, encrypts it by the same Yi and sends it
concatenated with RA to TA.
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1 Y1
… …
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Trusted Authority
Unit A
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…
…
i
t-1
Unit A
Output key stream
cmd: Generate response
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Generate response
Generate response
cmd
RSC based 
SUC
Figure 4: Enrollment protocol of SUC based on random stream ciphers
• TA decrypts the message as E−1(EYi(RA)) = R′A. If RA = R′A, the TA accepts
otherwise it rejects and aborts.
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…
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Figure 5: Identification protocol of SUC based on random stream ciphers
4.3 Update protocol
Figure 6 descibes the update protocol, it proceeds as follows:
• The TA and unitA authenticates each other by using the last response Yt−1.
• Unit A generates t-responses and sends them encrypted with Yt−1 to the TA as
EYt−1(Y0, Y1, ..., Yt−1).
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• TA decrypts the received data by using Yt−1 as E−1Yt−1(EYt−1(Y0, Y1, ..., Yt−1)) =
Y0, Y1, ..., Yt−1 and updates unit A responses in its UIR.
k-cycle Y
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1
…
i
i+1
…
t-2
t-1
Trusted Authority
Unit A
RSC based 
SUC
Unit A
Y0
Y1
…
Yi
Yi+1
…
Yt-2
Yt-1
SUC runs for t-cycles Where in each             
cycle a new response Yi is generated
cmd
1 1
0 1 1
1
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, ,...,
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t t
t
Y Y t
Y Y Y
E E Y Y Y
− −
−
−
−
=
-1
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the last pair  tY→
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( , ,..., )
tY t
E Y Y Y
− −
iY
Figure 6: Update protocol of SUC based on random stream ciphers
5 Hardware Complexity
Mass production requires lightweight identification mechanisms for economic reasons. SUCs
as clone-resistant identities gain special interest because it is possible to be implemented
with zero-cost. Most FPGA applications do not consume the total resources offered by the
deployed FPGA. In such cases, our proposed SUC unit requires very few FPGA resources
and can be added incrementally to the existing application for zero-costs.
The KSG described in Figure 2 is modeled in VHDL and synthesized to check its hardware
complexity and performance. Libero SoC with its integrated tools is used to implement the
design; Mentor Graphics Modelsim ME design tool was used for simulation and Synplify
pro ME for synthesis.
Table 3 describes the resources consumed for different devices of SmartFusion R©2 SoC
FPGAs family.
Table 3: Hardware complexity of the KSG in SmartFusion R©2 SoC FPGAs
KSG components Resources usage % of usagefor M2S005
% of usage
for M2S150
Type of resources LUTs DFFs LUTs DFFs LUTs DFFs
NLFSRs Shift registers 0 223 0 3.71 0 0.15
Feedback Functions 32 0 0.52 0 0.02 0
Combining Function 5 0 0.09 0 0.005 0
Total 37 223 0.61 3.71 0.025 0.15
The KSG requires 37 LUTs and 223 DFFs, this can be considered as zero cost in many
real applications. Implementation mechanism of the SUC based on the proposed family
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of new stream ciphers is not presented in this paper, a concept for creating SUC in
SmartFusion R©2 SoC FPGAs is presented in [MAMH17].
Implementation method Figure 7 describes an FPGA implementation concept of SUC
based on combining random NLFSRs. Each NLFSR is providing one bit per cycle to the
combining function. This makes it possible to distribute NLFSRs over all the FPGA where
only one connection is required to connect an NLFSR to the combining function. This
constitutes an advantage over SUC based on block cipher designs.
F
FPGA Fabric
Figure 7: Combining random NLFSRs to build an SUC
6 Conclusion
In this paper, a new large class of Key Stream Generators KSGs as stream ciphers is
presented. The class is created by random selection of a set of maximum-period NLFSRs
with different lengths. It is shown that a random selection of one Secret Unknown Cipher
(SUC) from this class, can serve to convert future VLSI-devices (in a post-fabrication
process) into clone-resistant entities. The security level of the proposed cipher class against
many attacks is evaluated and shown to be scalable to cope even with post-quantum
security requirements. i.e. as the attack complexity exceeds 2160, the cipher structure
can cope even with post-quantum cryptographic requirements at relatively moderate
implementation complexity. A lightweight proposed generic Identification/authentication
protocol for such physical SUC based structures is also presented. A sample prototype
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case showed that one SUC structure consumes relatively minor FPGA resources; (0.61% of
the LUTs, 3.71% of DFFs) in the smallest Microsemi SmartFusion R©2 SoC FPGA M2S005
devices, and (0.025% LUTs, 0.15% DFFs) for the largest M2S150 device. Future work
is in progress to fine-tune and optimize ciphers and SUC structures for emerging VLSI
technologies.
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